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This article argues that militant clients should be understood
as a pillar of Iran’s grand strategy and an extension of its
military power. The article examines why Iran has relied on
militant clients since the 1979 revolution and the benefits and
costs of its client approach. In evaluating these issues, it iden-
tifies five main areas where Iran has gained from its client
strategy: 1) maintaining independence from the West; 2) suc-
cessfully exporting its religio-political worldview; 3) extending
its military reach and power; 4) reducing political costs of its
foreign activities; and 5) establishing needed regional allies. It
further identifies five main dangers that Iran faces by continu-
ing its strategic behavior: 1) increased pressure from the
United States and a broader US military regional footprint;
2) more unified regional adversaries; 3) the risk of unintended
escalation with the United States and regional adversarial
states; and 4) enduring regional instability and insecurity
Introduction
In the 21st century, no state has had more success in utilizing militant
clients outside its borders toward strategic ends than the Islamic Republic
of Iran. In the conflicts in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, Iran’s clients have
blossomed into effective proxy forces that have successfully advanced
Iran’s interests at the ground level. Iran’s relationships with its clients
have helped it expand its political influence in those countries, extend its
military power beyond its borders, and secure an advantageous position
vis-a-vis its regional rivals. Iran’s behavior could continue to pay off over
the long term, especially should those conflicts eventually resolve in Iran’s
favor. However, it could also lead to military conflict between Iran and
its chief regional adversaries or the United States.
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Iran’s reliance on militant clients is not new; rather, it is rooted in the
country’s post-1979 political orientation.1 After the 1979 revolution, the
Islamic Republic’s leaders adopted a foreign policy that promoted national
independence, proscribed alliances with foreign powers, rejected the status
quo of the international system, and downplayed the importance of close
relations with neighboring states.2 Since then, in lieu of forging alliances
with its neighbors or foreign powers, the Islamic Republic’s leaders have
continued to place emphasis on the development of militant clients—espe-
cially among co-religionist Shiites—in foreign countries at the substate
level. At the head of that campaign has been the Islamic Revolutionary
Guards Corps (IRGC)—Iran’s preeminent military and a powerful voice in
its strategic decision-making—whose clients have become some of the most
powerful military actors in the Middle East’s wars.3
Through its support to militants and broader strategic behavior, Iran has
remained a perennial, leading policy concern for US administrations. Yet
despite its importance to US policy and its growing regional influence,
scant scholarly attention has been paid to Iran’s use of militant clients as
tools of military power and grand strategy.4 Several valuable studies have
focused on Iran’s support for terrorism outside its borders.5 But given the
increasingly large role militant groups play in regional warfare, terrorism as
a theoretical lens is now too narrow to explain the place of militant clients
in Iran’s foreign involvement and their centrality to Iranian grand strategy.
1Iran utilized proxies (such as Iraq-based Kurdish groups) toward strategic ends before the 1979 revolution as
well. But the centrality of clients in the Islamic Republic’s grand strategic approach and the nature of its ties to
clients are fundamentally different from those of its predecessors.
2The terms Iran, Islamic Republic, Tehran, and the Iranian regime are used interchangeably in this article and
mean the collection of leaders and military commanders that influence and decide the Islamic Republic of
Iran’s strategic policy. Thus, for the sake of clarity, the broader terms above (Iran, Islamic Republic, the regime,
etc.) have been favored to describe the authorship of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s actions.
3On the IRGC, see: Afshon Ostovar, Vanguard of the Imam: Religion, Politics, and Iran’s Revolutionary Guards (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2016); Bayram Sinkaya, The Revolutionary Guards in Iranian Politics: Elites and
Shifting Relations (London: Routledge, 2015); Hesam Forozan, The Military in Post-Revolutionary Iran: The
Evolution and Roles of the Revolutionary Guards (London: Routledge, 2015); and Ali Alfoneh, Iran Unveiled: How
the Revolutionary Guards is Turning Theocracy into Military Dictatorship (Washington, DC: American Enterprise
Institute, 2013).
4Ostovar, Vanguard of the Imam; Afshon Ostovar, “Sectarianism and Iranian Foreign Policy,” in Beyond Sunni and
Shia: The Roots of Sectarianism in a Changing Middle East, ed. Frederick Wehrey (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2018); Thomas Juneau, “Iran’s Policy Towards the Houthis in Yemen: A Limited Return on a Modest
Investment,” International Affairs 92, no. 3 (May 2016): 647–63; Abbas William Samii, “A Stable Structure on
Shifting Sands: Assessing the Hizbullah-Iran-Syria Relationship,” Middle East Journal 62, no. 1 (Winter
2008): 32–53.
5Daniel Byman, Deadly Connections: States that Sponsor Terrorism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2005),
79–115; Daniel Byman, “Iran, Terrorism, and Weapons of Mass Destruction,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 31,
no. 3 (April 2008): 169–81; Shahram Chubin, Whither Iran? Reform, Domestic Politics and National Security
(London and New York: Routledge, 2014); Matthew Levitt, Hezbollah: The Global Footprint of Lebanon’s Party of
God (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2015); Bruce Hoffman, Recent Trends and Future Prospects of
Iranian Sponsored International Terrorism (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1990); Edgar O’Ballance, Islamic
Fundamentalist Terrorism, 1979–95: The Iranian Connection (London: MacMillan Press LTD, 1997); Gawdat Bahgat,
“Iran and Terrorism: The Transatlantic Responses,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 22, no. 2 (1999): 141–52;
Alex S. Wilner, “Apocalypse Soon? Deterring Nuclear Iran and its Terrorist Proxies,” Comparative Strategy 31, no.
1 (February 2012): 18–40.
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Analysts associated with think tanks have looked at Iranian strategy more
closely,6 but the issue is deserving of more scholarship and crit-
ical attention.
This article argues that Iran’s reliance on clients is best understood as
part of its approach to grand strategy and national security. Grand strat-
egy encompasses a state’s understanding of its national security interests
and objectives, the threats to those interests and objectives, and what
military instruments should be used to advance those interests and objec-
tives.7 To that end, the article addresses three crucial questions: why has
Iran relied on militant clients since the founding of the Islamic Republic;
what has it gained from that practice; and what challenges lay ahead for
the continuance of that behavior. It further evaluates Iran’s approach by
identifying and examining the five main strategic benefits that clients
have provided Iran and the five main dangers Iran faces by continuing
this behavior.
Overall, Iran’s client approach has had mixed results. Neutral observ-
ers could easily conclude that its reliance on militants has been more
detrimental than positive. Indeed, Iran’s militant client policy has had a
severely negative impact on its international standing, economy, and
relations with foreign powers and neighboring states. Its threats to
export the revolution helped unite regional opposition against it—and in
support of Saddam Hussein—during the ruinous Iran–Iraq war.8 The
majority of sanctions placed on Iran since that war, while largely
directed at its nuclear enrichment program, have been politically under-
girded by its continued support of armed groups outside its borders.9
The intense international pressure placed on Iran over its nuclear pro-
gram has been also motivated in part by concerns that a nuclear weap-
ons capability would shield its extraterritorial campaign or that Iran
6J. Matthew McInnis, “Iranian Concepts of Warfare: Understanding Tehran’s Evolving Military Doctrines,” American
Enterprise Institute, 16 February 2017; Michael Eisenstadt, “The Strategic Culture of the Islamic Republic of Iran:
Religion, Expediency, and Soft Power in an Era of Disruptive Change,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy,
MES Monographs 7, November 2015; Afshon Ostovar, Rebecca Edelston, and Michael Connell, On Shifting Sands:
Iranian Strategy in a Changing Middle East (Alexandria, VA: CNA, 2013); Frederic Wehrey, et al., Dangerous But
Not Omnipotent: Exploring the Reach and Limitations of Iranian Power in the Middle East (Santa Monica: RAND
Corporation, 2009).
7See Barry R. Posen and Andrew Ross, “Competing Visions for US Grand Strategy,” International Security 21, no. 3
(Winter 1996/97): 5–53; also, S. Paul Kapur, Jihad as Grand Strategy: Islamist Militancy, National Security, and the
Pakistani State (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 8.
8F. Gregory Gause, The International Relations of the Persian Gulf (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010),
47; Shahram Chubin and Charles Tripp, Iran and Iraq at War (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988), 152–57.
9On the impact of sanctions, see: Mohammad Reza Farzanegan, “Effects of International and Energy Sanctions
on Iran’s Informal Economy,” SAIS Review of International Affairs 33, no. 1 (Winter-Spring 2003): 13–36; Nader
Habibi, “The Iranian Economy in the Shadow of Economic Sanctions,” Middle East Brief, no. 31, Brandies
University Crown Center for Middle East Studies (October 2008); Akbar E. Torbat, “Impacts of the US Trade and
Financial Sanctions on Iran,” The World Economy 28, no. 3 (March 2005): 407–34; and Jahangir Amuzegar,
“Iran’s Economy and the US Sanctions,” Middle East Journal 51, no. 2 (Spring 1997): 185–99.
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would provide nuclear weapons to its clients.10 Based on those assump-
tions, pundits and academics alike call for war with Iran to destroy its
nuclear facilities.11 The Trump administration included Iran among eight
other countries in its revised 2017 travel ban and listed the entire IRGC
as a specially designated organization due to its support to terrorist
groups.12 In sum, one could argue that Iran’s post-1979 development has
been severely retarded, and its insecurity exasperated, by its persistent
support to foreign militants and thereby its approach to grand strategy.
Such costs make Iran’s reliance on militants appear puzzling if not para-
doxical. However, as this article argues, from the standpoint of the political
and strategic objectives Iran’s leaders have championed since the revolu-
tion, its client building has been rational and effective. Since 1979, Iran’s
support for foreign militant groups has been about building relationships
with likeminded entities to secure its independence from foreign powers
and counter the United States, Israel, and other adversaries. While Iran had
modest success through the 1990s, its efforts since the turn of the 21st cen-
tury have had a more substantial strategic impact. During the post-2003US
occupation of Iraq, Iran successfully developed a network of clients that
fought to undermine US influence while also promoting Iran’s national
security agenda in Iraq. These clients have had an even more impressive
run in the post-2011 conflicts in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, where they have
individually and collectively increased in power, helped expand Iran’s polit-
ical and military influence, and been actively involved in countering Iran’s
adversaries on the battlefield. Altogether, Iran has been able to advance its
core strategic objectives primarily through its cultivation of militant clients
in the Middle East.
These questions and arguments will be pursued in the following sections.
The first section presents the article’s theoretical grounding and compares
Iran’s experience to Pakistan, which has pursued a similar client-based
strategy with different results. It further discusses the nature of the groups
supported by Iran and Pakistan and why the terms “militant” and “client”
are useful descriptors for Iran’s client allies. The second section discusses
Iran’s national security imperatives since the 1979 revolution. The third
section illustrates the development of the Islamic Republic’s client strategy
10Byman, “Iran, Terrorism, and Weapons”; Ashton B. Carter et al., “Reducing Nuclear Threats and Preventing
Nuclear Terrorism,” ed. National Security Advisory Group (NASG), Harvard Kennedy School Belfer Center for
Science and International Affairs (October 2007), http://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/files/
Reducing%20Nuclear%20Threats-FINAL.pdf.
11For example, see Matthew Kroenig, A Time To Attack: The Looming Iranian Nuclear Threat (New York: St.
Martin’s Press, 2014).
12US Department of Treasury, “Non-proliferation Designations; Iran Designations; Counter Terrorism Designation
Update,” 13 October 2017, https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Pages/
20171013.aspx; Adam Liptak, “Supreme Court Allows Trump Travel Ban to Take Effect,” New York Times, 4
December 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/04/us/politics/trump-travel-ban-supreme-court.html.
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through brief discussions of three crucial periods in its history. In its early
foreign activity during the revolution and Iran–Iraq war (1979–1988), Iran
helped establish Lebanese Hezbollah and Iraq’s Badr, its most important
clients and the backbone of its strategic successes in the 21st century. It
then honed the strategic use of clients during the US occupation of Iraq
(2003–2011), where Iran utilized its clients to weaken US influence in Iraq
by directly combating US and allied forces. Finally, Iran’s clients blossomed
as transnational military actors in the post-Arab Spring wars in Syria, Iraq,
and Yemen (2011–2017), where they have transformed into capable mili-
tary forces that have effectively extended Iran’s military reach and power
across the region.
These first three sections provide the context for the fourth section,
which: 1) evaluates the strategic logic of Iran’s client strategy; 2) identifies
and examines the five main benefits militant clients have provided for Iran
and the five main dangers that lie ahead; and 3) briefly considers the impli-
cations of Iran’s strategy for the United States and its allies. The final sec-
tion provides a summary of the article’s main points and proposes avenues
for future scholarship.
The Strategic Use of Militant Clients: Pakistan and Iran
Why do states sponsor armed groups when those groups can and often do
create serious security problems for the patron? That puzzle is the basis of
S. Paul Kapur’s and Sumit Ganguly’s innovative theorizing on Pakistan’s
use of militant proxies. Using Pakistan as a case study, Kapur and Ganguly
make a convincing argument for why the use of such groups is better
understood in terms of grand strategy and national security.13 Kapur
expands upon this thesis in another study that more deeply examines the
strategic value of Pakistan’s use of militant proxies, the role they play in
Pakistan’s conflicts and competition with India, the drivers behind
Pakistan’s decision-making, and the benefits and costs of Pakistan’s
approach to grand strategy.14 Kapur views Pakistan’s reliance on proxies as
a rational strategic choice in the country’s ongoing competition with India,
but one that has also had both expected and unanticipated outcomes.15
Drawing on an assessment of the history of Pakistan’s strategic behavior,
this scholarship proposes a theoretical framework for why countries might
pursue a proxy-based strategy. Yet because this framework is derived from
a single case study, its ability to explain other cases remains questionable.
13S. Paul Kapur and Sumit Ganguly, “The Jihad Paradox: Pakistan and Islamist Militancy in South Asia,”
International Security 37, no. 1 (Summer 2012): 111–41.
14Kapur, Jihad as Grand Strategy.
15Ibid., 2–3.
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Testing its applicability through other cases, such as Iran, would therefore
enhance its theoretical contributions and expand our understanding of why
and how states employ militant clients and how that behavior impacts
regional and international security.
Pakistan’s use of proxy militant groups goes back to the state’s found-
ing.16 Since that time, Pakistan has relied on militant groups (along with
conventional military forces and, eventually, nuclear weapons) as one of
its core “grand strategic tools.”17 This reliance stems partly from
Pakistan’s relative weakness vis-a-vis its more powerful rival, India. India’s
much larger conventional forces and nuclear arsenal are not something
Pakistan can surmount, which has pushed Pakistan’s decision-makers
toward a reliance on a network of Islamist militant groups. These groups
have been used offensively both to initiate and sustain conflict and have
operated at times and in areas where Pakistan’s conventional forces could
not without sparking escalation. This has provided Pakistan with an
offensive means that could be plausibly denied by the state, thereby
decreasing the chances of escalation with more powerful adversaries. They
have been a relatively inexpensive investment compared to conventional
military procurement and have proven difficult to counter by Pakistan’s
adversaries.18
Those strategic benefits have come at a steep cost. Although militant
groups have helped shield Pakistan from direct blame in certain instances,
they have saddled Pakistan with almost perpetual conflict and insecurity.
They have eroded the trust of its allies (especially the United States), desta-
bilized its neighbors (especially Afghanistan), and left Pakistan with the
reputation of supporting terrorism and extremism. They have spurred arch-
rival India to pursue a conventional arms build-up, increasing its military
power imbalance with Pakistan.19 Rogue attacks by militant groups have
put it at risk of unintended escalation with India. Pakistan has also increas-
ingly lost control of its proxies, leading to armed conflict and instability
inside the country. Finally, and more fundamentally, money spent funding
proxies has been money not spent addressing Pakistan’s numerous domes-
tic social and political challenges.20
On the whole, Kapur’s major findings regarding Pakistan hold true for
Iran as well, but with some key differences. First and foremost, Iran’s mili-
tant client program has been ascendant in the 21st century and continues
to produce more value than not for Iran’s leadership. Comparatively, as







the Islamic Republic of Iran’s—has exhausted many of the strategic benefits
it once produced and is now creating more insecurity than value for the
Pakistani state.21 Further, unlike Pakistan, Iran lacks a nuclear weapons
deterrent and its conventional military capabilities are relatively weak com-
pared to Pakistan’s. Iran is therefore more dependent on its militant clients
to extend its military power and produce both deterrent and offensive
capabilities, suggesting that militant clients contain more strategic value
and potential for Iran than they do for Pakistan.22
More broadly, Iran’s motivations and intentions with its clients differ siz-
ably from those of Pakistan. Unlike Iran, Pakistan has not stressed inde-
pendence from the United States or other foreign powers, allowing it more
flexibility in the security domain. Pakistan has maintained productive
(albeit at times tense) relations with foreign powers (such as the United
States and China) and other regional states (such as Saudi Arabia), whereas
Iran has been mostly isolated. Pakistan therefore has had less need for sub-
state allies (as opposed to simply proxies), because its productive relation-
ships with powerful states afford it more in terms of defense and security
than Iran has been able to achieve through its more limited state-to-state
relations. Nonetheless, Pakistan’s motivations for cultivating the Taliban are
in many ways similar to Iran’s motivations for developing its main clients,
particularly as they have been used as a means of managing interests and
countering the influence of rivals in a neighboring (or nearby) state—a
means that can exist outside of (or augment) the more normative state-to-
state diplomatic process.23
Iran’s deeper alliances with its clients have helped it more effectively
navigate what Kapur describes as the principle–agent problem.24 While
Pakistan and its clients share certain political objectives and a certain
worldview concerning Kashmir and India, they do not adopt their
patron’s state interests to the same degree that Iran’s clients do.25 In
Pakistan’s case, proxies have been developed from militant groups within
Pakistan, Kashmir, and neighboring Afghanistan. They have been mostly
composed of Pakistani nationals or have come from ethnic communities
whose populations straddle Pakistan’s borders. The major groups spon-
sored by Iran, however, operate outside of the country, and most do not
share an ethnic or tribal linkage to it.26 Religious identity and authority





25By way of comparison, see Ibid., 14.
26An exception here would be Iran’s patronage of the Persian-speaking, Shiite Hazara organization, Hezb-e
Wahdat, and productive ties with other Persian-speaking Sunni Tajik groups in Afghanistan during the 1990s,
especially Jamiat-e Islami.
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(Lebanese Hezbollah and Iraqi Shiite militias) not only share the Twelver
Shiite religion of Iran’s leadership (and the majority of its citizens), they
also have adopted Iran’s theocratic system as their ideological program
and view Iran’s supreme leader as their ultimate religio-political authority.
The religious and ideological connection between Iran and its clients is
significantly different than the political links between Pakistan and its
proxies and is perhaps one of the chief reasons that Iran has been able
to cultivate closer ties and extract more loyalty out its clients than
Pakistan has.27
However, because Iran does not have absolute control over its clients,
the principle–agent problem still applies, particularly in terms of the risk
of unintended escalation by way of rogue or miscalculated behavior by its
agent-clients. Further, Iran’s alliances are not set in stone, and a number
of factors can potentially lead to a distancing between Iran and its cli-
ents.28 For example, unlike Hezbollah and Iraqi militias, the leaders of
Yemen’s Ansar Allah organization (also known as the Houthis) are adher-
ents of Zaydi (not Twelver) Shiism and do not view Iran’s supreme
leader as their ultimate religio-political authority. The Houthis and Iran
are allied against Saudi Arabia and share major ideological positions
(anti-Israel and anti-American policies in particular), but those commonal-
ities have so far been reinforced by conflict and the Houthis’ lack of
alternative patronage. If conditions for the Houthis changed inside
Yemen, or should they find additional or alternative outside patronage,
their alliance with Iran could easily weaken.
The nature of these patron–client relationships makes the terminology
used to describe them important. Such as with Pakistan, Iran’s clients have
been widely described as terrorists, nonstate actors, militias, insurgents, and
quasi-state or even official state paramilitaries. Those terms describe par-
ticular characteristics of different groups; however, none of them suffi-
ciently encompasses the spectrum of characteristics that Iran’s clients share.
In particular, the terrorism rubric no longer sufficiently explains what these
clients have become: militaries that fight wars. Definitions of terrorism
center on the targeting of noncombatants and the goal of influencing or
instilling fear in target populations toward political ends.29 Although
Iran’s clients might engage in terrorism, that is no longer their central
strategic value for Iran. Rather, and comparable to Kapur and Ganguly’s
distinction regarding Pakistan’s proxies, Iran’s clients are foremost involved
27Kapur, Jihad as Grand Strategy, 117–21.
28Iran’s support has not always been sufficient to overcome the independent interests of its clients. For
example, Iran lost influence with former Twelver Shiite clients, the Supreme Islamic Council of Iraq and Hezb-e
Wahdat, when the agendas of those organizations began to depart from that of Iran.
29On definitions of terrorism, see Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006),
40–41; and Byman, Deadly Connections, 8–9.
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in battlefield success.30 For that reason, Kapur’s usage of the broader
term “militant” is more apt than the alternatives and is consequently
used here.
There is also a tension between the terms client and proxy. Kapur
favors the term “proxy” to describe the armed groups sponsored by
Pakistan. That term works well but can also suggest an inherent lack of
agency on the part of the sponsored groups. As Pakistan’s case has
shown, a core challenge in the principle–agent relationship is that the
agent can go its own way for a variety of reasons. These groups might
operate as proxies through certain behavior but can also pursue goals
independent from their sponsor. In other words, even though a militant
group can serve as a proxy, its relationship to a supporting power is not
necessarily one of deference or mutual strategic vision. These relationships
can be transactional and based on little more than temporarily
intersecting political interests.31 In Iran’s case (and perhaps, at
certain times, in Pakistan’s too), the term “client” better describes the
patron–client relationship Tehran has with those groups it is allied with.
Here this term is meant to help distinguish transactional proxies from
client allies. Transactional proxies might receive support and act at times
in ways that help advance some of their patron’s objectives, but they do
not share all or even most of that patron’s agenda, politics, or ideology.
That inherent distance makes their relationship based more so on quid
pro quo support than on the shared pursuit of broad-ranging goals
and ambitions.
Because Iran provides support (such as arms) to many groups, it is
helpful to further clarify what differentiates a “militant client” from a trans-
actional proxy. In this article, the term “militant” is used to mean specific-
ally any armed group sponsored by Iran that has used armed violence to
help advance Iran’s strategic goals as an active combatant in conflict or
war. The term “client” is specifically reserved for organizations allied with
Iran that receive their primary means of outside support from Iran and: a)
operate alongside or under the command of IRGC commanders in conflict
zones; and/or b) control enough territory (particularly airports and bor-
ders) to enable a sustained Iranian ground presence in their areas of oper-
ation and direct Iranian military support. These parameters limit the
article’s focus to Iran’s strongest relationships in Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and
Yemen. The article does not include Palestinian groups (such as Hamas
and Islamic Jihad) because Iran has no ground presence in Gaza or the
West Bank and neither group is allied with Iran’s broader regional
30Kapur and Ganguly, “Jihad Paradox,” 111.
31By way of comparison, see Kapur, Jihad as Grand Strategy, 18–20.
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agenda.32 It also does not include Afghanistan-based groups, because out-
side of periods in the 1980s and 1990s, Iran has not had a stable client in
Afghanistan and the groups that remain friendly with it (such as Jamiat-e
Islami and Hezb-e Wahdat) do not actively support its regional agenda, do
not broadly share its anti-US policies in Afghanistan, and do not receive
their primary means of support from Iran.33 Similarly, groups that have
received some form of support from Iran but are not allied with it or have
other major outside patrons, such as the Taliban, Hezb-e Islami, al Qaeda,
PFLP-GC, and Bosnian groups, are also not included.
Iran’s National Security Imperatives and the Role of Clients
How and why Iran has relied on militant clients is rooted in its post-1979
approach to grand strategy. The 1979 revolution was above all an assertion
of Iran’s independence from the United States and foreign influence writ
large. It was also anti-monarchical and Shia Islamist in political orientation.
Those positions put revolutionary Iran at odds with not only America, but
all of her regional allies as well—Israel and the Sunni monarchies of the
Persian Gulf foremost.34 Since its establishment, the Islamic Republic’s
chief national security concerns have remained centered on the United
States and her allies.35 US troops stationed in neighboring countries, the
US Fifth Fleet operating out of Bahrain, US maritime operations in the
Persian Gulf, and US military cooperation with Israel and Arab states are
deemed threats. Western cultural influence—from democracy to secular-
ism—is considered an insidious form of soft war and behind nearly all epi-
sodes of domestic unrest and civil disturbance in Iran.36 Likewise, the rise
of jihadist groups (including al Qaeda and ISIS) is seen as a project of the
West, Israel, and Saudi Arabia to destroy the Islamic Republic and its
allies.37 As Iran’s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, told a crowd of supporters
32Iran’s disagreements with Hamas and PIJ over regional issues have been well noted. For example, see
“Baznegari ‘Hamas’ va ‘jehad-e eslami’ dar ravabet-e khod ba iran” [A review of Hamas’s and Islamic Jihad’s
relationships with Iran], Mashregh, 26 December 2015, https://www.mashreghnews.ir/news/472437/.
33For example, see “Iran beh donbal-e gozine’i-ye jadid?” [Is Iran looking for a new alternative?], Hasht-e Sobh,
24 August 2015, http://8am.af/1394/06/02/iran-seeks-new-option-mohammad-mohaqeq/.
34On the Gulf Arab response, see Gause, International Relations, 46–57; and Anoushiravan Ehteshami, Iran: Stuck
in Transition (London: Routledge, 2017), 233–50.
35Ray Takeyh, Guardians of the Revolution: Iran and the World in the Age of the Ayatollahs (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2009), 11–33; Fred Halliday, “Iranian Foreign Policy Since 1979: Internationalism and
Nationalism in the Islamic Republic,” in Shi’ism and Social Protest, ed. Juan R. I. Cole and Nikki R. Keddie (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), 88–107.
36For example, see this text produced by the Basij popular militia, which has taken the lead in combating soft-
war in Iran: Mohammad Javad Akhvan, ‘Obur az Fetneh: Bazkhwani-ye Parvandeh-ye Yeksal-e Nabard-e
Narm [Overcoming Sedition: Reviewing the Record of Year One of the Soft War] (Tehran: Markaz-e
Motala‘at va Pazhuheshha-ye Sazman-e Basij-e Daneshjuyi, 2010).
37“Dar khast-e qovveh-ye qazaiyyeh az sepah va vezarat-e ettelaat / jelogiri az vorud-e jariyan-haye takfiri be
keshvar” [The Head of the Judiciary Requests the IRGC and Ministry of Information to Prevent the Infiltration
of Takfiris Into the Country], Mehr News Agency, 15 January 2014, http://mehrnews.com/news/2215145/; also,
Dina Esfandiary and Ariane Tabatabai, “Iran’s ISIS Policy,” International Affairs 91, no. 1 (January 2015): 1–15.
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in June 2014: “Our external challenge is the troublemaking by the [global]
arrogance. Let’s speak frankly; the troubles [are caused] by the United
States.”38 Simply put, the United States, together with its actual and per-
ceived mechanisms of influence in the Middle East (including alliances,
agreements, military sales, footprint, cultural and political sway, etc.), poses
an amorphous, persistent, and omnipresent challenge to the
Islamic Republic.
Navigating that challenge has fueled Iran’s strategic behavior.39 It has led
Iran into enduring cold wars with the United States, Israel, and Saudi Arabia
and added suspicion, tension, and antagonism to nearly all of its relation-
ships with its more pro-US neighbors (such as Turkey, Pakistan, Jordan,
Egypt, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates [UAE], Bahrain, and Qatar).40 To deal
with outside threats, Iran has invested in three main areas of defense and
deterrence (not including its nuclear program).41 Its ballistic missile program,
which includes rockets that can hit its neighboring rivals and Israel, has pro-
vided Iran with a stand-off capability. Ballistic missiles are Iran’s best form
of hard retaliation and a credible deterrent.42 Iran has also invested in cyber-
warfare capabilities, which have been used to target its adversaries’ economic
interests, infrastructure, and government websites and to harass and intimi-
date critics abroad.43 The most important and enduring effort, however, has
been the cultivation of foreign militant clients. Unlike the deterrent value
of ballistic missiles and the nonkinetic options afforded by cyber, militant
clients are the only tool Iran has for extending its strategic footprint and dir-
ectly countering its adversaries through armed force. For that reason, they
have become the centerpiece of Iranian grand strategy and an investment
Tehran is not likely to easily abandon.
38“Iran Never Giving in to West: Leader,” Al Alam, 4 June 2014, http://en.alalam.ir/news/1599907.
39Mohsen M. Milani, “Tehran’s Take: Understanding Iran’s U.S. Policy,” Foreign Affairs 88, no. 4 (July/August
2009): 46–62; also see Seyed Hossein Mousavian, Iran and the United States: An Insider’s View of the Failed Past
and the Road to Peace (New York: Bloomsbury, 2014), 200.
40Iran’s relations with its Arab neighbors experienced a period of gradual improvement during the 1990s before
relations returned to increasing tensions after the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. See Mohsen M. Milani, “Iran’s
Post-Cold War Policy in the Persian Gulf,” International Journal 49, no. 2 (June 1994): 328–54; Anoushiravan
Ehteshami, Dynamics of Change in the Persian Gulf: Political Economy, War and Revolution (London: Routledge,
2013), 25–45; and R. K. Ramazani, “Iran’s Foreign Policy: Both North and South,” Middle East Journal 46, no. 3
(Summer 1992): 393–412. On the Iran–Saudi rivalry, see Simon Mabon, Saudi Arabia and Iran: Power and
Rivalry in the Middle East (London: I.B. Tauris, 2016). For a different take, see Banafsheh Keynoush, Saudi Arabia
and Iran: Friend or Foes? (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2016).
41Iran’s nuclear program could be included as a fourth area, but because that program has not been
successfully militarized and remains in stasis due to the 2015 Joint Coalition Proposal of Action (JCPOA)
nuclear deal, it has not been included here.
42Bilal Y. Saab and Michael Elleman, “Precision Fire: A Strategic Assessment of Iran’s Conventional Missile
Program,” Atlantic Council Issue Brief, September 2016, Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security, http://
www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publications/Precision_Fire_web_0907.pdf; Farhad Rezaei, “Why Iran Wants So
Many Ballistic Missiles,” National Interest, 5 January 2017, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/why-iran-wants-so-
many-ballistic-missiles-18954.
43Collin Anderson and Karim Sadjadpour, Iran’s Cyber Threat: Espionage, Sabotage, and Revenge (Washington, DC:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2018).
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Although large, Iran’s military is technologically weak compared to most
of its neighbors.44 Enduring sanctions on Iran have prevented it from pro-
curing advanced weaponry on the open market and from modernizing much
of its military—particularly air, land, and sea platforms. The 2015 nuclear
deal includes provisions that will allow Iran to purchase conventional arms
without UNSC approval after 2020 and will lift certain restrictions on non-
nuclear missile development in 2023.45 Even so, its military procurement and
spending has long lagged behind that of its neighbors.46 According to the
data collected by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
(SIPRI), Iran spends far less on defense than its neighboring rivals. As of
2014, Iran’s defense spending was around 2.35 percent of GDP. Between
2000 and 2014, Iran’s defense spending has averaged just below 2.7 percent
of GDP.47 Since 2014, and perhaps in response to its growing military com-
mitments, Iran’s defense spending began to gradually increase.48 In early
2017, Iran’s government committed to raising defense and military spending
to “at least” 5 percent of GDP through 2021.49 By comparison, Saudi Arabia,
Iran’s chief regional rival, increased its defense spending from 7.24 percent
in 2011 (its lowest percentage of spending per GDP since 1988) to 13.49 per-
cent of GDP in 2015.50 Whereas Iran’s defense spending has estimated to
have decreased from around $13.5 billion in 2010 to around $10 billion in
2016,51 one estimate placed Riyadh’s total military spending at near $80 bil-
lion or 25 percent of the overall Saudi budget.52 In 2016, Saudi Arabia had
44Anthony H. Cordesman and Abdullah Toukan, Iran and the Gulf Military Balance, (working paper, Center for
Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, October 2016), https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-
public/publication/161004_Iran_Gulf_Military_Balance.pdf.
45Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), “UN Arms Embargo on Iran,” SIPRI Arms Embargoes
Archive, https://www.sipri.org/databases/embargoes/un_arms_embargoes/iran.
46See Anthony H. Cordesman, Military Spending and Arms Sales in the Gulf: How the Arab Gulf States Now
Dominate the Changes in the Military Balance, April 28, 2015 (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic &
International Studies, 2015), https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/
150428_military_spending.pdf.
47SIPRI’s data on Iran is accessible through the World Bank’s Open Data website, http://data.worldbank.org/
indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS?locations¼IR.
48“Iran to Hike Military Spending Despite Lower Oil Prices, Sanctions,” Reuters, 7 December 2014, http://www.
reuters.com/article/us-iran-economy-idUSKBN0JL0H320141207; Abbas Qaidaari, “More Planes, More Missiles,
More Warships: Iran Increases Its Military Budget by a Third,” Al-Monitor, 13 July 2015, http://www.al-monitor.
com/pulse/en/originals/2015/07/khamenei-orders-increase-military.html.
49This increase is part of the Iranian government’s larger five-year development plan. Bozorgmehr Sharafedin,
“Iran to Expand Military Spending, Develop Missiles,” Reuters, 9 January 2017, http://www.reuters.com/article/
us-iran-military-plan-idUSKBN14T15L. Also see Bijan Khajehpour, “Will New 5-year Plan Solve Iran’s Economic
Problems?,” Al-Monitor, 10 June 2016, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/06/iran-sixth-five-year-
development-plan-rouhani-parliament.html.
50SIPRI’s data on Saudi Arabia is accessible through the World Bank’s Open Data website, http://data.worldbank.
org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS?locations¼SA.
51These estimates are based on SPRI data. See “Iran Military Expenditure: 1988–2017,” Trading Economics, http://
www.tradingeconomics.com/iran/military-expenditure.
52Ben Moshinsky and Will Martin, “Saudi Arabia Spends £56 Billion a Year on Its Insane Military—Here’s What
That Kind of Money Buys,” Business Insider, 19 February 2016, http://www.businessinsider.com/saudi-arabia-
spends-80-billion-on-its-military-2016-2. A lower estimate is provided by Janes, which draws from Saudi
“budgetary documentation” to suggest that 2016 defense spending was projected to be closer to $54.7 billion.
See Craig Caffrey, “Saudi Arabia Reveals 6.6% Defence Spending Rise for 2017,” HIS Jane’s 360, 28 December
2016, http://www.janes.com/article/66555/saudi-arabia-reveals-6-6-defence-spending-rise-for-2017.
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the fourth largest defense budget behind the United States, China, and
India.53 Saudi Arabia and the UAE are both expected to increase defense
spending even more in the coming years to counter Iran, with a focus on
offensive-centric systems such as precision air-to-ground missiles and fighter
refueling capabilities.54 The delta between Iran’s military budget and the
combined budget of its adversaries is vast.55
It is not known how much Iran spends on its foreign clients, and those
costs are not likely to be reflected in official Iranian budgetary numbers. In
2016, Lebanese Hezbollah admitted that it receives all of its funding and
weaponry from Iran,56 which in 2010 the US Department of Defense esti-
mated to be worth between $100 and $200 million annually.57 Were that
figure to be similarly illustrative of Iran’s financial commitment to its cli-
ents (not including government-to-government aid) in Iraq, Syria, and
Yemen—or even quadrupled in all countries—it still would not come close
to matching the military spending of Iran’s neighboring rivals, much less
that of the United States. President Barack Obama explained that imbalance
in May 2015 like this: “[Iran’s military budget is] $15 billion compared to
$150 billion for the Gulf States.”58 Given the above data, the assumption
here is that Iran spends less—and perhaps far less—on defense than its
nearest peer rivals in the region, even including its support for its clients in
Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen. This is not to suggest that funding clients
is inexpensive or unburdensome, but rather that it is a cheaper and more
effective strategic investment than competing with its neighbors through
conventional defense spending.59 Further, unlike accessing advanced weap-
onry on the open market as its neighbors can, the client approach is one
that has been available for Iran to pursue.
What military value does Iran get for its foreign investments? First, Iran
can credibly threaten to strike its opponents through its clients. Hezbollah
in Lebanon has targeted Israel with rocket attacks; Shiite militias in Iraq
regularly attacked US troops there before the removal of US forces in 2011;
53Benjamin D. Katz, “Saudi Arabia on Offensive With Attack-Minded Military Splurge,” Bloomberg, 16 February
2017, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-02-17/saudi-arabia-on-offensive-with-attack-minded-
military-splurge.
54Ibid. Also, Kapur finds Pakistan’s actions have similarly pushed India to invest more heavily in offensive
conventional military capabilities: Kapur, Jihad as Grand Strategy, 27.
55By way of comparison, see Kapur, Jihad as Grand Strategy, 10.
56“Hezbollah to Send More Fighters to Syria’s Aleppo,” Al Jazeera, 24 June 2016, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/
2016/06/hezbollah-send-fighters-syria-aleppo-160624180847854.html.
57US Department of Defense figure is cited in: Carla Humud et al., “Iranian Assistance to Groups in Yemen, Iraq,
Syria, and the Palestinian Territories,” Memorandum to Senator Mark Kirk, 31 Jul 2015 (Washington, DC:
Congressional Research Service, 2015), http://freebeacon.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/20150731-CRS-
Memo-to-Senator-Kirk-Iran-Financial-Support-to-Terrorists-and-Militants-1.pdf.
58Ilan Dayan, “Obama Talks on Israeli TV About Netanyahu, Israel, and Davit Blatt [Transcript],” Jewish Journal, 2
June 2015, cited in Carla Humud et al., “Iranian Assistance.”
59By way of comparison, see Kapur, Jihad as Grand Strategy, 21–22.
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and the Houthis in Yemen have attacked Saudi Arabia at sea, on land, and
through ballistic missile strikes. The Houthis also launched failed missile
attacks against a US naval vessel off the coast of Yemen, triggering US
cruise missile strikes against Houthi-controlled coastal radar stations in
response.60 Iran’s ability to strike at its opponents through clients provides
it a mechanism of retaliation that can have a deterrent effect. Second, cli-
ents afford Iran a mechanism of political influence in states in which it has
a strategic stake. In places such as Iraq or Lebanon, where Iran’s clients
have gained political power, Iranian influence can transcend security
dynamics and (to differing degrees) impact state-level decision-making.61
Third, and of increasing importance, clients expand Iran’s military reach in
regional wars and have become an extension of Iran’s military power.
Iran’s clients have been active in the post-2011 wars in Syria, Iraq, and
Yemen, where they have fought to advance Iran’s interests and counter the
interests of Iran’s rivals on the battlefield.
Although Iran’s relationships with each of its clients is different, and
those clients in turn see Iran’s patronage through their own unique lenses,
in the aggregate these client allies have helped it advance its strategic goals
across the region and vis-a-vis its chief adversaries. Clients enable Iran to
take, hold, and defend territory by proxy. Even if that territory is not occu-
pied or absorbed by Iran, it is controlled by Iran’s allies and not ceded to
their adversaries. Altogether, Iran’s client network has transformed into a
sophisticated system of power projection that has afforded Tehran immense
strategic value.
How did Iran achieve this? What circumstances led its leaders to adopt
policies and a strategic outlook that increased its regional power but also
alienated it from much of the world? The following sections explore the
evolution of the Islamic Republic’s strategic reliance on militant clients by
briefly discussing three transformational periods in its history: the 1979
Islamic revolution through the Iran–Iraq war; the US occupation of Iraq;
and the post-Arab Spring wars in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen.
Revolution and War (1979–88)
The Islamic Republic’s reliance on clients is a product of its enduring hos-
tility to the United States and US influence in the Middle East. After the
1979 revolution, instead of acceding to the status quo and building trust
60Phil Stewart, “U.S. Military Strikes Yemen After Missile Attacks on U.S. Navy Ship,” Reuters, 12 October 2016,
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-missiles/u-s-military-strikes-yemen-after-missile-attacks-on-u-
s-navy-ship-idUSKCN12C294.
61Pakistan has used proxies to similar effect in Afghanistan, Kashmir, and in India proper. Kapur, Jihad as Grand
Strategy, 10, 22.
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with foreign states, Iran’s leaders sought to transform their region—and the
Muslim world more broadly—by exporting their revolution to like-minded
polities outside of Iran. In practice, this meant developing contact with and
providing support to foreign liberation movements and Islamist armed
groups. At the helm of that project was the IRGC, the Islamic Republic’s
newly-established military force, which considered developing foreign mili-
tant allies to be critical to Iran’s national security.62 As the organization
stated in 1980, “We have no recourse … and must, with the mobilization
of forces in every region, strike fear in the heart of our enemies so that the
idea of invasion and the destruction of the Islamic revolution will exit
[their minds].”63 By pursuing such a strategy, Iran quickly became, by its
own doing, a revolutionary island surrounded by an ocean of hostility.64
The period of the Iran–Iraq war (1980–1988) further shaped Iran’s client
approach. During the war, neighboring Arab states (with the exception of
Syria), Western European powers, the United States, and the Soviet Union
all backed Iraq. Iraq benefitted from billions in loans from Saudi Arabia
and Kuwait, US political backing and intelligence support, and military
sales from France and the Soviet Union. Iran, on the other hand, had tepid
outside support and much less access to outside military procurement and
loans.65 The imbalance confirmed for Iran’s leaders that a global cabal led
by the United States and supported by regional states would stop at little—
even total war—to defeat the Islamic revolution. That alienation and sense
of injustice hardened Iranian perspectives toward the international system
and reinforced the necessity of self-reliance in military affairs.66 The legacy
of the war continues to shape the perspectives of Iran’s leaders and their
national security decision-making.67
During the war, Iran helped organize Iraqi Shiite expatriates and prison-
ers of war into its first Iraqi clients: the Supreme Council for Islamic
Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) and its armed-wing, the Badr Corps.68 Of those
two, Badr became the most important. It served as an all-Iraqi division of
the IRGC during the war and remained under IRGC command through
the 1990s. As part of the IRGC, Badr was involved in military and
covert cross-border operations against Iraqi forces at different points in the
62Ostovar, Vanguard of the Imam, 102–107; Alfoneh, Iran Unveiled, 205–206.
63Payam-e Enqelab, 19 March 1980, 32. Cited in Ostovar, Vanguard of the Imam, 102.
64As Stephen M. Walt has argued, revolutionary states often seek to oppose the policies of their former regime,
which can create new conflicts with other powers and allies of the previous regime. Stephen M. Walt,
Revolution and War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), 5.
65On the imbalance in foreign support during the war, see Dilip Hiro, The Longest War: The Iran–Iraq Military
Conflict (New York: Routledge, 1991), 213–40.
66Takeyh, Guardians of the Revolution, 104–107; Michael Axworthy, Revolutionary Iran: A History of the Islamic
Republic (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 292–94.
67Ariane M. Tabatabai and Annie Tracy Samuel, “What the Iran–Iraq War Tells Us about the Future of the Iran
Nuclear Deal,” International Security 42, no. 1 (Summer 2017): 152–85.
68Faleh A. Jabar, The Shiite Movement in Iraq (London: Saqi, 2003), 235–59.
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war.69 Badr had at best a modest impact, but its value skyrocketed after it
and SCIRI returned to Iraq following the toppling of Saddam Hussein in
2003 (discussed below).
Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon provided the IRGC with another
opportunity. During the war, the IRGC helped organize Lebanese Shiite
militants into a pro-Iranian armed group later branded Hezbollah. The
IRGC helped arm, train, and provide logistics to Hezbollah during the
1980s and continues to do so. Its on-the-ground support linked Iran to
vicious terrorist attacks committed by Hezbollah’s armed wing, Islamic
Jihad, which included the bombings of the US embassy and US
marines barracks in 1983 and various kidnappings of American and
European officials.70 Hezbollah gradually grew to become the most
powerful political organization in Lebanon, with expansive social wel-
fare, security, and commercial roles. In many ways, it operates as a
state within a state.
U.S. Occupation of Iraq (2003–2011)
The US occupation of Iraq was the single most important event in the
transformation of Iran’s client strategy. During the occupation, Iran’s cli-
entage grew from an assortment of allied militant groups to a formidable
mechanism of covert and overt influence in Iraq. Iran’s clients not only
helped facilitate the expansion of Iranian power in post-Baathist Iraq, they
did so by directly harassing and fighting US forces in the country. Iraq was
a proving ground for Iran’s clients, where they grew in sophistication and
capability and developed tactics designed to counteract US military forces
and political objectives.
The backbone of Iranian influence in Iraq was SCIRI and Badr. Along
with the Dawa Party and other Shiite groups, SCIRI and Badr made
inroads into the new Iraqi system, helping to advance Iranian interests
through elected politics (SCIRI) and the security sector (Badr).71 SCIRI
changed its name to the Supreme Islamic Council of Iraq in 2007 to down-
play its former embrace of Khomeinist style theocracy, eventually leading
to a political split with the staunchly pro-Iranian Badr and a distancing
69Jabar, Shi’ite Movement in Iraq, 253–54.
70Nicholas Blanford, Warriors of God: Inside Hezbollah’s Thirty-Year Struggle Against Israel (New York: Random
House, 2011), 44–48; also, see Ostovar, Vanguard of the Imam, 112–17.
71On the political involvement of Badr and SCIRI, see Juan Cole, “Shia Militias in Iraqi Politics,” in Iraq: Preventing
a New Generation of Conflict, ed. Markus E. Boullon, David M. Malone, and Ben Rowswell (Boulder and London:
Lynne Rienner, 2007), 109–121; also, Joseph Felter and Brian Fishman, Iranian Influence in Iraq: Politics and
“Other Means” (West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 2008), 27.
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from Iran. Badr remained closely allied with Iran and expanded its mission
beyond the security sector into politics and development.72
The IRGC also succeeded in peeling away militants from Muqtada al-
Sadr’s Mahdi Army movement, leading to the formation of two major
pro-Iran clients: Asaib Ahl al-Haq (League of the Righteous), led by Qais
al-Khazali, and Kataib Hezbollah (Hezbollah Brigades), associated with for-
mer Badr member Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis.73 These groups received
robust training and lethal aid from Iran, and by 2011, with sophisticated
IRGC-supplied weaponry such as mortars and armor-piercing explosively
formed penetrators (EFPs), they had become the primary threat to US
forces in Iraq.74
After the Arab Spring: Syria, Iraq, and Yemen (2011–2017)
As with the US occupation of Iraq, post-Arab Spring conflicts created oppor-
tunities for the further development of Iran’s clientage. In the wars in Syria,
Iraq, and Yemen, Iran’s clients transformed from militant groups into mili-
tary forces and moved from operating in the shadows to the open battlefield.
Allied clients provided Iran a mechanism to fight against its adversaries on
multiple fronts by proxy and in the process became an extension of Iran’s
military power and the foundation of its growing regional might.
Syria
Iran’s leaders considered the Arab Spring unrest in Syria as a threat to
Iran’s national security. The Assad government was a partner in Iran’s sup-
port to Hezbollah, shared Tehran’s anti-Israel agenda, and was a key node
in Iran’s ability to put pressure on Israel.75 Iranian military officials framed
72Mariam Karouny, “Iraq’s Top Shiite Party Changes Name, Platform,” Reuters, 12 May 2007, http://www.reuters.
com/article/us-iraq-party-idUSL1221651520070512. Also, Mustafa Habib, “Official Split: Shifting Shiite
Allegiances Change Political Landscape,” Niqash, 15 March 2012, http://www.niqash.org/en/articles/politics/
3011/; and Susannah George, “Breaking Badr,” Foreign Policy, 6 November 2014, http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/
11/06/breaking-badr/.
73Nicholas Krohley, The Death of the Mahdi Army: The Rise, Fall, and Revival of Iraq’s Most Powerful Militia (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2015) 80–81. Also, see Amir Toumaj, “Iraq Monument Underscores Iranian
Commander’s Role in Qods Force,” Long War Journal, 24 February 2017, http://www.longwarjournal.org/
archives/2017/02/iraq-monument-underscores-iranian-commanders-role-in-qods-force.php.
74Felter and Fishman, “Iranian Strategy in Iraq,” 55–82. Also, Tim Craig and Ed O’Keefe, “U.S. Military Says Iran
Behind Rising Death Toll,” Washington Post, 30 June 2011, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/3-us-troops-
killed-in-iraq-adding-to-deadly-month/2011/06/30/AGrDQprH_story.html.
75The Iran–Syria supply network to Hezbollah is longstanding and appears to be on-going, despite interruptions
incurred by Syria’s civil war. Iran’s armed forces chief, Maj-Gen Mohammad Baqeri, admitted that Iran had had
a missile factory in Aleppo that was used to supply Hezbollah during the 2006 war with Israel: Radio Farda, 10
November 2016, http://www.radiofarda.com/a/f35_bagheri_aleppo_iran_israel_missiles/28107518.html. Also,
Nicholas Blanford, “Syria’s Secretive Rocket Industry Spotlighted by Israeli Weapons Seizure,” Christian Science
Monitor, 11 March 2014, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Security-Watch/Under-the-Radar/2014/0311/Syria-s-
secretive-rocket-industry-spotlighted-by-Israeli-weapons-seizure-video; and Yaakov Lappin and Jeremy Binnie,
“Israeli General Says Syria Has Resumed Weapons Production for Hizbullah,” IHS Janes 360, 17 June 2016,
http://www.janes.com/article/61491/israeli-general-says-syria-has-resumed-weapons-production-for-hizbullah.
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the Syrian conflict as a strategic dilemma. Mehdi Taeb, the former com-
mander of the IRGC’s Basij paramilitary division, called Syria “a strategic
province for [Iran]” and claimed that Syria was more vital to Iran’s security
than Iran’s southern Khuzestan province, which had been invaded and
occupied by Iraqi forces in 1980. On that point he reasoned: “If the enemy
attacks and aims to capture both Syria and Khuzestan, our priority would
be Syria. Because if we hold on to Syria, we would be able to retake
Khuzestan; yet if Syria were lost, we would not be able to keep
even Tehran.”76
The IRGC began providing military aid to Syria in mid-March 2011,
soon after protests against the regime of Bashar al-Assad began.77 Regular
flights from Tehran to Damascus carried weapons and personnel to assist
the Assad regime. Washington sought to discourage Iran’s intervention
through a series of sanctions, but to little effect.78 The IRGC initially com-
mitted mostly officers to the war—which seemed to follow the organ-
ization’s claims that its members served as advisors—but expanded its
deployment as the war dragged on.79 As IRGC officers began to die in
action in Syria, eventually including several of their highest ranking and
most experienced operatives, it became clear that Iranians were serving
near or at the front lines.80 The funerals of Iranian troops killed in Syria
revealed a gradual expansion of the IRGC’s burden to include a proportion
of lower-ranking and noncommissioned officers, as well as specialists from
the Basij paramilitary division and the regular military (artesh).81
76“Ra’is-e qarargah-ye ‘ammar: olaviyyat-e ma negahdari surieh beh ja-ye Khuzestan ast” [Head of Ammar Base:
Our Priority is Defending Syria Over Khuzestan], BBC News (Persian Service), 14 February 2013, http://www.bbc.
co.uk/persian/iran/2013/02/130214_nm_tayeb_syria_basij.shtml.
77Final Report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Resolution 1929 (2010), United Nations Security
Council (UNSC) S/2012/395, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-
CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2012_395.pdf.
78See US Department of the Treasury, “Administration Takes Additional Steps to Hold the Government of Syria
Accountable for Violent Repression Against the Syrian People,” 18 May 2011, https://www.treasury.gov/press-
center/press-releases/Pages/tg1181.aspx; US Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Designates Iranian
Commercial Airline Linked to Iran’s Support for Terrorism,” 12 October 2011, http://www.treasury.gov/press-
center/press-releases/Pages/tg1322.aspx; US Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Targets Iranian Arms
Shipments,” 27 March 2012, http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1506.aspx; and US
Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Designates Syrian Entity, Others Involved in Arms and Communications
Procurement Networks and Identifies Blocked Iranian Aircraft,” 19 September 2012, http://www.treasury.gov/
press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1714.aspx.
79Through 2016, the number of Iranian nationals serving in a military capacity in Syria does not appear to have
surpassed a few thousand. See Jonathan Saul and Parisa Hafezi, “Iran Boosts Military Support in Syria to
Bolster Assad,” Reuters, 21 February 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-crisis-iran-
idUSBREA1K09U20140221; and Dugald McConnell and Brian Todd, “Iran Steps Up Its Forces in Syria,” CNN, 28
October 2015, http://www.cnn.com/2015/10/27/middleeast/iran-syria-troop-buildup/.
80Iran’s military role was confirmed in footage taken by an IRGC filmmaker killed in a firefight with rebels near
Aleppo: See “Iran’s Secret Army,” BBC News, September 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/n3cstnps.
Also, Saeed Kamali Dehghan, “Elite Iranian General Assassinated Near Syria–Lebanon Border,” The Guardian, 14
February 2013, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/feb/14/elite-iranian-general-assassinated-syria-
lebanon; and Parisa Hafezi, “Senior Iranian Revolutionary Guards General Killed in Syria—IRGC,” Reuters, 9
October 2015, http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-mideast-crisis-syria-general-idUKKCN0S30MD20151009.
81Paul Bucala, Iran’s New Way of War in Syria, Report by the Critical Threats (CT) Project of the American
Enterprise Institute (AEI) and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), February 2017, 3–5.
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To cope with the manpower shortages—and seemingly in lieu of drawing
from its own enlisted ranks or other Iranian forces—the IRGC facilitated the
entry of its Lebanese and Iraqi clients into the war. Hezbollah initially entered
to sure up critical Lebanese border areas and land arteries to Damascus, but
gradually became involved in the fighting across the country.82 Shiite militias
from Iraq (such as Asaib Ahl al-Haq and Kataib Hezbollah) were brought in
by the IRGC to defend the Sayyida Zaynab area, a largely Shiite suburb of
Damascus, but similarly expanded operations across the country. New pro-
Iranian Iraqi militias with a more Syrian focus were also established (such as
Liwa Abu Fadl al-Abbas and Liwa Kafil Zaynab).83
The IRGC also began developing paramilitary forces among Syrians and
noncitizen immigrant populations in Iran. The former, known as the
National Defence Forces (NDF), was composed of pro-Assad Alawites,
Shiites, Christians, and a smattering of Sunnis. IRGC commanders spoke
of the Syrian NDF, which served under IRGC command and alongside
Syrian regular forces, as a new Iranian client. In May 2014, General
Hossein Hamadani, who headed training operations in Syria for the IRGC
before he was killed in action in October 2015, claimed that in the NDF,
“Iran [had] established a second Hezbollah in Syria.”84 The latter were
auxiliary forces composed of Afghan and Pakistani Shiite immigrants pri-
marily living in Iran. The Afghan Fatemiyoun and Pakistani Zaynabiyoun
brigades quickly became a fixture on the front lines where they served as
something akin to a foreign legion for the Quds Force.85 The development
of these brigades seems to have been a measure designed to simultaneously
increase the IRGC’s contribution to the fight and minimize the casualties
of Iranian citizens. Indeed, by late 2016, Iranian authorities announced that
the country had lost over one thousand soldiers to the conflict, the major-
ity of which had come from the Afghan and Pakistani brigades.86
Iraq
The Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham’s (ISIS) massive offensive across
northern Iraq in June 2014 triggered a quick Iranian response. The IRGC
82See Marisa Sullivan “Hezbollah in Syria,” Middle East Security Report, No. 19, ISW, April 2014.
83Hayder al-Khoei, “Syria, Iraq and the Struggle for Power: Intertwined Futures,” Chatham House, November
2016, 11–12, https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/publications/research/2016-11-24-syria-
iraq-struggle-for-power-intertwined-futures-al-khoei.pdf; Christopher Anzalone, “Zaynab’s Guardians: The
Emergence of Shia Militias in Syria,” CTC Sentinel, 23 July 2013, https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/zaynabs-
guardians-the-emergence-of-shia-militias-in-syria.
84Arash Karami, “Former IRGC Commander’s Comments on Syria Censored,” Al-Monitor, 6 May 2014, http://www.
al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/05/former-irgc-commander-syria-comments-censored.html.
85Farzin Nadimi, “Iran’s Afghan and Pakistani Proxies: In Syria and Beyond?,” Washington Institute for Near East
Policy, PolicyWatch No. 2677, 22 August 2016.
86Bozorgmehr Sharafedin, “Death Toll Among Iran’s Forces in Syrian War Passes 1,000,” Reuters, 22 November 2016,
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-iran-idUSKBN13H16J; Thomas Edbrink, “Iran, Once Quiet
About Its Causalities in Syria and Iraq, Now Glorifies Them,” New York Times, 9 July 2016, https://www.nytimes.
com/2016/07/10/world/middleeast/iran-once-quiet-about-its-casualties-in-syria-and-iraq-now-glorifies-them.html.
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sent aid and scores of advisors and troops to assist Iraqi forces. IRGC
Quds Force chief, Qassem Soleimani, took an early lead in operational
planning against ISIS, working closely with Iranian client bosses Hadi al-
Ameri, al-Khazali, al-Muhandis, and other militia leaders. Following Grand
Ayatollah Ali Sistani’s fatwa calling for a popular army to defeat ISIS, the
Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF, hashd al-shaabi), an umbrella organiza-
tion that brought together various Iraqi militias, was established. Iranian
clients—including Badr, Kataib Hezbollah, Asaib Ahl al-Haq, Abu al-Fadl
al-Abbas, and Kataib Imam Ali—comprised approximately one third of the
PMF’s total forces, which also included al-Sadr’s militia, Sunni tribal forces,
and other groups.87 Al-Muhandis, a close contact of Soleimani, was
appointed PMF military commander. The IRGC provided training and
assistance to the organization. Basij chief Mohammad Reza Naqdi sug-
gested that the training was aimed at shaping the PMF along the lines of
the IRGC’s Basij militia—a sentiment indicating that the IRGC’s intentions
for training the PMF could be to develop it into a stable and long-
term client.88
The collapse of the Iraqi military in Mosul and parts of northern Iraq
opened the door to the rapid expansion of the PMF’s role and influence in
the war. Iranian advisory forces operated alongside PMF militants and (at
times) Kurdish Peshmerga forces in battles across the front lines. PMF
forces operated parallel to, but generally apart from, US-backed Iraqi gov-
ernmental forces. US air power and on-the-ground support, combined with
the zeal and tenacity of Iraqi forces, led to a gradual success against ISIS
through 2016.89 The PMF’s success in the conflict raised its domestic
standing.90 In November 2016, formal recognition was given to the PMF
by Iraq’s parliament, which passed a law making the umbrella group an
official state military force.91
Yemen
Compared to the situations above, less is known about Iran’s involvement
in Yemen. Reporting from the country is limited, and it is difficult to
87Al-Khoei, “Syria, Iraq and the Struggle,” 16; Abbas Qaidaari, “Comparing Iraq’s Shiite Forces to Iran’s Basij,” Al-
Monitor, 11 May 2015, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/ru/contents/articles/originals/2015/05/iran-iraq-iraq-
basij-forces.html.
88“Amadegi-e milyun-ha basiji baray-e e‘zam beh surieh va gaza” [Millions of Basijis Ready for Deployment to
Syria and Gaza], Nama News, 17 November 2014, http://namanews.com/News/105938/.
89Ahmad Majidyar, “Iran-Backed Militant Groups Make Territorial Gains in West Mosul,” Middle East Institute, 12
January 2017, http://www.mei.edu/content/is/iran-backed-militant-groups-make-territorial-gains-west-mosul.
90Al-Khoei, “Syria, Iraq and the Struggle,” 17.




corroborate information emanating from regional media. US officials
believe that Iran has provided military and financial support to the Houthis
since the early 2000s.92 Iranian officials have vaguely admitted providing
the Houthis aid, particularly since their 2009 conflict with Yemen’s govern-
ment and Saudi Arabia, but routinely reject accusations of providing mili-
tary assistance.93 Iran’s support to the Houthis has been a subplot of
Yemeni security dynamics over that time and is in part what drove Saudi
Arabia and its allies to intervene militarily in Yemen in 2015.94 Although
the IRGC appears to have held a lighter footprint in Yemen compared to
its engagement in Syria and Iraq, ample evidence suggests it has been
involved in a campaign to supply the Houthis with weaponry from small
arms to missile technology throughout the war.95 Indeed, weaponry that in
part or whole originated from Iranian stockpiles has been used by the
Houthis to attack Saudi Arabian territory.96
Unlike Syria and Iraq, Yemen has not been historically central to Iranian
regional strategy. However, given Yemen’s border with Saudi Arabia, the
Houthis likely have grown in importance to Tehran as its competition with
Riyadh has increased. Iran and its clients, especially Hezbollah, are the only
outside supporters of the Houthi movement. Such dynamics would make
Iran a likely beneficiary of a Houthi victory. Some have argued that Iran’s
long-term intention is to transform the Houthis into a Hezbollah-like force
that can be used to gain leverage against Saudi Arabia or potentially
threaten US and Saudi ships off the Yemeni coast.97 Iran has even sug-
gested the desire to have an enduring military presence in Yemen, includ-
ing a naval base—a sheer impossibility outside of a total defeat of the
Saudi-led intervention.98 Others have made the case that Iran’s ambitions in
92US State Department spokesman Marie Harf said of Iran’s links to the Houthis: “There is a well-documented
history of support for the Houthi [sic], including money and arms, that goes back a long time.” See Oren
Dorell, “Iranian Support for Yemen’s Houthis Goes Back Years,” USA Today, 20 April 2015, http://www.usatoday.
com/story/news/world/2015/04/20/iran-support-for-yemen-houthis-goes-back-years/26095101/.
93For example, see comments by IRGC chief Mohammad Ali Jafari: “Farmandeh-ye sepah: iran beh yaman
‘komak-e mostashari’ mi-konand” [IRGC Chief: Iran Provides “Relief Assistance” to Yemen], Tasnim, 24
November 2017, https://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1396/09/03/1582560.
94On the Houthi conflict, see Emile Hokayem and David B. Roberts, “The War in Yemen,” Survival 58, no.6
(December 2016–January 2017): 157–86.
95See Warren Strobel, “Elite Iranian Guards Training Yemen’s Houthis: U.S. Officials,” Reuters, 27 March 2015,
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-houthis-iran-idUSKBN0MN2MI20150327; and US Department
of Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions Hizballah Leadership,” 22 August 2013, https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/
press-releases/Pages/jl2147.aspx. Also, see Alexander Corbeil and Amarnath Amarasingam, “The Houthi
Hezbollah: Iran’s Train-and-Equip Program in Sanaa,” Foreign Affairs, 31 March 2016, https://www.
foreignaffairs.com/articles/2016-03-31/houthi-hezbollah.
96“Iranian Technology Transfers to Yemen,”Conflict Armament Research, March 2017, http://www.conflictarm.com/
download-file/?report_id¼2465&file_id¼2467.
97Corbeil and Amarasingam, “Houthi Hezbollah.”
98Nasser Karimi, “Iran Considers Naval Bases in Yemen, Syria,” Associated Press, 26 November 2016, http://
bigstory.ap.org/article/c47327870b6e4efa8859d4b09cd3ddd8/iran-considers-naval-bases-yemen-syria.
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Yemen are more limited.99 Either way, Iran’s link to the Yemen conflict has
led Saudi Arabia—Iran’s chief regional rival—into a complex and expensive
war.100 Beyond developing a proxy on Saudi Arabia’s border, distracting its
neighbors from other regional conflicts and bogging them down in an
expensive war might be reason enough for Iran to maintain Houthi support.
Evaluating Iran’s Militant Strategy
Supporting foreign militants has been central to the Islamic Republic’s
grand strategy since its establishment. That strategy was born out of some
of the revolutionary regime’s founding assumptions: that Iran and the
Islamic world more broadly are in an existential conflict against Western
imperialism; and that the United States and its regional allies (primarily
Israel and Saudi Arabia) pose an enduring threat to Iran’s revolution and
the sanctity of its Islamic system. That perspective placed Iran at odds with
virtually all of its neighbors and the West. Lacking alliances and friendly
relations with surrounding states, Iran’s revolutionary leaders sought to
develop allies at the substate level. That strategy had limited success
through the 1990s, but has paid increasing dividends in the 21st century.
Given its perception of the threat environment and national security
imperatives, Iran has achieved a considerable amount through its militant
client strategy. Those gains can be boiled down to five main areas. First
and foremost, the Islamic Republic has maintained its independence from
the West. Second, the regime has successfully exported its worldview to
foreign Shiite communities—a foundational goal of the IRGC and the
Islamic Republic’s clerical founders.101 Hezbollah and the Iraqi militias all
embrace Iran’s political ideology and view its supreme leader, Ali
Khamenei, as their own spiritual and political guide,102 outwardly adopting
the fundamental assumptions of the Islamic Republic’s strategic agenda as
their own. By sharing Iran’s perspectives of the international system, particu-
larly of the enduring and existential threats posed by the United States and its
99The extent of Iran’s influence over the Houthis remains a subject of debate. For example, Thomas Juneau, “No,
Yemen’s Houthis Actually Aren’t Iranian Puppets,” Washington Post, 16 May 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.
com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/05/16/contrary-to-popular-belief-houthis-arent-iranian-proxies; also, April
Longley Alley and Joost Hiltermann, “The Houthis Are Not Hezbollah,” Foreign Policy, 27 February 2017, http://
foreignpolicy.com/2017/02/27/the-houthis-are-not-hezbollah/.
100Angus McDowall, Phil Stewart, and David Rohde, “Yemen’s Guerrilla War Tests Military Ambitions of Big-
spending Saudis,” Reuters, 19 April 2016, http://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/saudi-military/.
101By way of comparison, see Kapur, Jihad as Grand Strategy, 14.
102See comments made by the representative to Iran of the Iraqi militias Asaib Ahl al-Haq and Kataib Hezbollah
on those groups’ allegiance to Iran’s supreme leader: “Nemayande-ye moqavemat-e eslami-e ‘asa’eb ahl-e
haq-e ‘eraq dar iran” [Iran Representative of Islamic Resistance Group Asaib Ahl al-Haq of Iraq], Tasnim News,
6 November 2014, https://web.archive.org/web/20150619003107/http://www.tasnimnews.com/Home/Single/
550169; and “Goftogu-ye tafsili-e fars ba nemayande-ye ‘asa’ib ahl al-haq dar Iran” [Fars’ detailed interview
with Iran representative of Asaib Ahl al-Haq], Fars News Agency,16 November 2014, farsnews.com/newstext.
php?nn ¼13930824000516. Also, see Naim Qassem, Hizbullah: The Story From Within, trans. Dalia Khalil
(London: Saqi, 2010), 199–223.
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regional allies, Iran’s clients also inherently share many of its core objectives
in the Middle East, especially in the Syrian, Iraqi, and Yemeni conflicts.103 As
the patron, Iran arguably gains the most from such an arrangement, but the
clients also gain politically and organizationally from Iran’s support.
Third, militant clients have been used effectively to directly and indirectly
counter Iran’s enemies while distancing it from those confrontations and
providing a degree of deniability.104 Shiite militias in Iraq were used to har-
ass and target US forces militarily and were responsible for hundreds of
American deaths in Iraq through 2011.105 Shiite militia violence in Iraq also
coincided with rising American pressure on Iran.106 That Iran could strike
American forces by proxy in Iraq certainly complicated the Bush adminis-
tration’s management of the Iraq war and was likely to have been a factor in
the administration’s Iran policy.107 More importantly, Iranian pressure
helped scuttle the American agenda for Iraq. The failure of the United States
to achieve a Status of Forces Agreement with Iraq in 2011, which led to the
removal of US forces from the country by the end of that year, was in part a
testament to Iran’s ability to influence Iraqi politics at multiple levels.108
Since the war against ISIS began, Iraqi militias have continued to lob threats
at US forces in Iraq.109 Given the US commitment to the government of
Baghdad and the resolve of both the Obama and Trump administrations to
defeat ISIS in Iraq and Syria, it is likely that Iran’s militant clients’ apparent
willingness to strike US forces will remain a complicating aspect of US policy
toward Iraq and Iran.
In Syria, Iran’s clients have been used to counter the forces supported by
the United States, Western European powers, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and
other Arab states. They have also fought Salafi-jihadist groups (Nusra
Front, Ahrar al-Sham, ISIS, and others) that espouse virulent anti-Shiite
103By way of comparison, see Kapur, Jihad as Grand Strategy, 108–109.
104This is a key similarity in the usage of clients in the Iran and Pakistan cases. See Kapur, Jihad as Grand
Strategy, 22–23.
105The precise number of American troops killed by Iran-backed groups in Iraq is uncertain. US defense officials
put the number at around five hundred, including both Iraq and Afghanistan. Other former military officers
that served in Iraq believe the number is much higher. See Andrew deGrandpre and Andrew Tilghman, “Iran
Linked to Deaths of 500 U.S. Troops in Iraq, Afghanistan,” Military Times, 14 July 2015, http://www.
militarytimes.com/story/military/capitol-hill/2015/07/14/iran-linked-to-deaths-of-500-us-troops-in-iraq-
afghanistan/30131097/.
106See Ali M. Ansari, Confronting Iran: The Failure of American Foreign Policy and the Next Great Crisis in the
Middle East (New York: Basic Books, 2006); Scott Ritter, Target Iran: The Truth about the White House’s Plans
for Regime Change (New York: Nation Books, 2006); and David Barsamian et al., Targeting Iran (San Francisco:
Open Lights Books, 2007).
107David E. Sanger, The Inheritance: The World Obama Confronts and the Challenges to American Power (New
York: Harmony Books, 2009), 105–106; also, Ostovar, Vanguard of the Imam, 175–76.
108Ewen MacAskill, “Iraq Rejects US Request to Maintain Bases After Troop Withdrawal,” The Guardian, 21
October 2011, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/oct/21/iraq-rejects-us-plea-bases; also, Michael R.
Gordon, “In U.S. Exit from Iraq, Failed Efforts and Challenges,” New York Times, 22 September 2012, http://
www.nytimes.com/2012/09/23/world/middleeast/failed-efforts-of-americas-last-months-in-iraq.html.
109For example, Raf Sanchez, “Iran-backed Shia Militia Says It Will Fight US Marines Deployed to Iraq,” Telegraph,
21 March 2016, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iraq/12200172/Iran-backed-Shia-
militia-says-it-will-fight-US-Marines-deployed-to-Iraq.html.
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ideologies. Iran’s coalition has benefited from clarity of mission as well as
political and ideological unity. By comparison, the rebellion has faltered in
both ways and been undermined by the rise of Salafi-jihadist groups,
severely constraining foreign state support to the rebels.110 Further, whereas
the rebels’ main backers, such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar, have primarily
limited their contribution to funds and materiel support, Iran and its cli-
ents have maintained a robust ground presence on the front lines since
early in the conflict. In addition to the Russian intervention in Syria, which
was reportedly instigated by Soleimani, these factors have helped Iran and
its clients gradually out-compete their rivals on the ground.111 Should the
Syrian conflict resolve to Iran’s benefit, its position in that country will be
strengthened, its lines of support to Hezbollah will have been preserved,
and it could gain a larger geographic position from which to tar-
get Israel.112
Similarly, in Yemen, the Houthis have helped create a conflict that has
led Iran’s chief regional rivals—Saudi Arabia and its GCC allies—into a
costly military intervention.113 Iran has provided the Houthis relatively lit-
tle in comparison to what the Saudis, Emiratis, and Americans have outlaid
to the Hadi government. Iran has sent dhows full of small arms and rock-
ets, whereas the Saudis and Emiratis have provided land forces, expensive
air assets and ordinance, and naval vessels as part of their military inter-
vention in Yemen. In other words, whether by its own doing or out of
sheer opportunism, Iran has helped stoke—or sufficiently associate itself
with—a fire in Yemen that has consumed the attention of its rivals and
shifted their focus away from Syria. Further, should the Houthis succeed
and the Saudi intervention fail, Iran is set to gain by being the only outside
backer of the Houthi movement, potentially giving Iran a geographical plat-
form to credibly threaten the Saudis and maritime traffic in the Bab
al-Mandab strait.114 Even should the Houthis fail, Iran’s investment in
Yemen has been low-cost and high-reward.115
Fourth, by fighting wars through clients, Iran has availed itself deni-
ability and reduced the domestic political costs of foreign adventurism.
110Aron Lund, “The Slow, Violent Fall of Eastern Aleppo,” The Century Foundation, 7 October 2016, https://tcf.org/
content/commentary/slow-violent-fall-eastern-aleppo/.
111“Iran Quds Chief Visited Russia Despite U.N. Travel Ban: Iran Official,” Reuters, 7 August 2015, http://www.
reuters.com/article/2015/08/07/us-russia-iran-soleimani-idUSKCN0QC1KM20150807; Ian Black, “Wake-Up Call on
Syrian Army Weakness Prompted Russian Intervention,” The Guardian, 1 October 2015, http://www.
theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/01/syrian-military-weakness-russian-intervention.
112Paul Antonopoulos, “Iraqi Shi’a Militia Creates Brigade to Liberate the Syrian Golan Heights from Israeli
Occupation,” Al-Masdar News, 9 March 2017, https://www.almasdarnews.com/article/iraqi-shia-militia-creates-
brigade-liberate-syrian-golan-heights-israeli-occupation/.
113On the size and expense of the Saudi-led intervention, see Hokayem and Roberts, “War in Yemen.”
114This is something the Houthis have already done. See “Yemen’s Houthis Attack Saudi Ship, Launch Ballistic
Missile,” Reuters, 31 January 2017, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-saudi-idUSKBN15E2KE.
115Juneau, “Iran’s Policy,” 663.
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Iran’s approach to the war in Syria is a good example of the latter point,
because even as the Iranian regime has emphasized the importance of the
war, attempted to normalize it domestically, and nurtured a culture that
celebrates its fallen soldiers as heroes and martyrs, the involvement of
Iranian nationals in the war has remained limited in comparison to the
involvement of noncitizen recruits and non-Iranian clients.116 To be sure,
Iran has incurred political costs at the international level for its client
strategy: sanctions, hostility from neighboring states, and Iran’s general
alienation at the regional and world stages can all be attributed in part
to Iran’s extraterritorial activities. It has also compromised its independ-
ence from foreign powers by partnering with Russia in the Syrian con-
flict. However, those have been shown to be bearable costs for Iran and
ones it has been able to navigate successfully over the years, such as by
striking a nuclear deal with the P5þ 1 without compromising its nonnu-
clear strategic activities.
Finally, Iran’s emphasis on building a militant clientage at the substate
level has addressed its need for allies.117 With the rise of its clients in
Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, Iran’s network has transformed into a
transnational military alliance that actively promotes and defends Iran’s
regional interests. Retired IRGC Brigadier General Mohammad Ali Falaki
spoke on this development in July 2016, claiming that a “Shia Liberation
Army” had been formed “under the command” of Soleimani and “obedient
to the authority” of Iran’s supreme leader. The force is described as being
comprised of Iran’s allies in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen and operating
as “a single front” across all those countries. Falaki claims that people of
other regions could also be brought into the fold if the force was needed in
their areas. He further describes the transnational army as being
completely united, sharing Iran’s strategic goals and fighting for a shared
purpose: “with one uniform, under one flag, as one organization, and as
one front they fight jihad.”118
Such statements are no doubt aspirational, but they also speak to a cer-
tain truth of what Iran has achieved through its client strategy. It has devel-
oped a bloc of allies that can simultaneously be used to assert Iran’s
interests abroad while countering those of its rivals. To that extent, Iran
has been able to realize an international alliance that can effectively
116In May 2016, IRGC regional commander Aynollah Tabrizi stated that 1,200 fighters had been “martyred” in
Syria; the majority of these had likely come from Afghan and Pakistani paramilitary units. See “Ravayat-e
moshaver-e farmandeh-ye sepah-e karbala’i-ye mazandaran az ‘khan tuman’” [Advisor of Commander of
Mazandaran Karbala Corps’ Account of ‘Khan Tuman’], ISNA, 9 May 2016, http://www.isna.ir/news/
95022012343/. Also, see Bucala, “Iran’s New Way of War.”
117By way of comparison, see Kapur, Jihad as Grand Strategy, 79–80, 98–102.
118“Sardar falaki, az farmandehan-e jebhe-ye suriyeh dar goftogu ba saiyt-e khabari mashreq” [Sardar Falaki, One
of the Commanders of the Syrian Front, in an Interview with Mashregh News], Bultan News, 24 July 2016,
http://www.bultannews.com/fa/news/385539/.
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challenge the dominance of its pro-American neighbors in regional con-
flicts, if not in regional politics more widely.
By the metrics above, Iran’s strategy has proven effective. However, it
has also come at steep costs. Iran’s international alienation; the extensive
sanctions that have negatively impacted its economy and kept it decades
behind its neighbors in most areas of military development; the intense
outside scrutiny of its foreign, military, and domestic policies; its poor rela-
tions with neighbors; and its simmering tensions with Israel, Saudi Arabia,
and the United States are all an outgrowth of its strategic choices. From a
neutral perspective, Iran’s militant strategy appears to have made it weaker
and less secure than its neighbors whose grand strategies have more closely
adhered to international norms. But within the context of Iranian national
security thinking, the militant client strategy has made the Islamic Republic
more formidable in the region and better able to counter the United States
than at any other point in its nearly forty year history.119
Yet a reliance on militant allies poses a number of longer-term problems
for Iran. In particular, Iran faces five major dangers should it remain com-
mitted to its client strategy. First, Iran’s deep involvement in regional con-
flicts is likely to be considered by the United States as an enduring
justification for applying political pressure against the regime, retaining if
not expanding its military footprint in the Middle East, and potentially
escalating its military role in the region’s wars.
Second, Iran’s foreign operations have hardened attitudes against it, par-
ticularly among the region’s Sunnis. Neighboring Sunni states see Iran as a
sectarian actor and the single largest threat to peace and security in the
Middle East.120 Iran’s role in regional conflicts has galvanized rival Arab
states against it and made them more committed to countering Iran and its
clients through force.121 It has also helped unify opposition to Iran in the
region, such as by aligning the once conflicting strategic views of Israel,
Saudi Arabia, and UAE against Iran and its allies.122
Third, the actions of its clients put Iran at risk for unintended escalation
with hostile states. Its adversaries perceive the clients to be proxies, so that
any act committed by them—whether sanctioned by Iran or rogue—is seen
by extension as an act of Iran.123 An attack by a client against an Iranian
119For example, see comments by IRGC chief Ali Jafari on the fall of Aleppo: “Sarlashkar-e ja‘afari dar hamayesh-
e hefazat-e havapayma’i” [Major General Jafari at Air Defense Corps Seminar], Fars News Agency, 24 December
2016, http://www.farsnews.com/13951004000076.
120Adel Bin Ahmed al-Jubeir, “Can Iran Change?,” New York Times, 19 January 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/
01/19/opinion/saudi-arabia-can-iran-change.html; Ostovar, “Sectarianism and Iranian Foreign Policy,” 88–92.
121Ben Hubbard, “Dialogue With Iran Is Impossible, Saudi Defense Minister Says,” New York Times, 2 May 2017,
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/02/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-iran-defense-minister.html.
122John Irish and Andrea Shalal, “Saudi Arabia, Israel Present de facto United Front Against Iran,” Reuters, 19
February 2017, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-iran-idUSKBN15Y09R.
123By way of comparison, see Kapur, Jihad as Grand Strategy, 18–19, 27.
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state adversary could lead to escalation against Iran. Suspected Houthi
attacks against US and Saudi naval vessels off the coast of Yemen have
already led the Trump administration to put Iran “on notice” and impose
additional sanctions on the IRGC.124 Whereas the Obama administration
appeared reluctant to punish Iran for the actions of its clients in order to
pursue (and later to preserve) the nuclear deal, the Trump administration
has taken a stronger line against Iran.125 Sanctions are an inconvenience,
but a military conflict with the United States or Arab neighbors would be
far more damaging.
Fourth, Iran risks being trapped by enduring instability and insecurity.
Regardless of whether it wins or loses in its region’s conflicts, continuing
its client strategy could perpetuate instability. Should its clients fail to
achieve victory Syria, Iraq, and (to a lesser extent) Yemen, it is more likely
that Iran will seek ways to perpetuate conflict in those countries rather
than accept a peace settlement that undermines its investments and dilutes
its influence. Even if absolute victory was deemed unlikely or impossible,
Iran could still encourage instability at a relatively low cost to keep its ene-
mies’ attention and resources mired in conflict.
Conversely, should Iran win in any or all of the region’s wars, the chal-
lenge of enduring instability will still remain. Iran’s clients might be strong
in war, but for them to be influential in the postwar, their states will need
to be weak in peace. In order for Iran and its clients to maximize their
influence within the countries where they operate, the governments of
those states must be susceptible to that influence. Iran’s clients are designed
for political conflict and war, not governance. Even those clients that
achieve dominance and control will struggle with balancing the necessities
of governance with the necessities of political relevance and legitimacy.126
In order for Syria and Iraq or Lebanon and Yemen to thrive, armed groups
will need to be disbanded and absorbed into state militaries or demobilized
and disarmed. Such actions could neuter Iran’s allies and impede their abil-
ity to influence the political and security dynamics of their countries.
While Iran might succeed in compelling a future post-conflict Syria or
Yemen to accept its strategic agenda—such as it has partly achieved in
Iraq—those states are likely to remain internally weak and insecure for dec-
ades. An alliance of failed or near failing states will have limited utility and
will continue to be costly to Iran in terms of its poor reputation in the
international community and financial and military expenditures. Tehran
124Julian Borger and David Smith, “Trump Administration Imposes New Sanctions on Iran,” The Guardian, 3
February 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/feb/03/trump-administration-iran-sanctions.
125Andrew Ward, “BP Opts Out of Iran Deals Ahead of Trump Hard Line on Tehran,” Financial Times, 2 January
2017, https://www.ft.com/content/b73c0e9e-ce7b-11e6-b8ce-b9c03770f8b1.
126Hezbollah is a good example; its enduring conflict with Israel is inexorably linked to its raison d’être as an
armed force but not as a political organization. See Blanford, Warriors of God, 473.
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would arguably gain more by tempering its anti-American and anti-Israel
policies and pursuing productive relations with its neighbors and
Western powers.
Fifth, Iran’s regional focus and involvement in foreign wars could exas-
perate political tensions domestically. The widespread protests that threat-
ened internal security in late 2017 and early 2018 occurred in provincial
areas historically more favorable to the regime’s religious conservatism,
revealing growing disillusionment with the regime and government policies.
Although economic challenges—unemployment, widespread corruption in
the banking sector, and increasing disparities in wealth distribution—
appeared to be the main galvanizing force behind the protests, a number of
other issues were also advanced by the demonstrators. Among them was a
condemnation of Iran’s regional foreign policy, especially the notion that
the regime prioritizes funding for its militant clients while normal Iranians
are struggling to get by. A government poll taken after the protests con-
firmed that Iran’s support to foreign groups was a core complaint for some
respondents (13.5 percent).127 If Iran continues to emphasize support to
militant clients and an assertive role in regional conflicts without address-
ing its many social and economic challenges, the issue has the potential to
trigger further unrest at home and erode the regime’s favorability among
its core constituencies: the urban and rural poor.128
Finally, it is worth considering the implications for the United States
and its regional allies. Of foremost importance is recognition that Iran’s
support to foreign clients transcends the political and is substantially
larger than the terrorism issue. Clients are at the core of Iran’s grand
strategy and essential to its national security objectives. They are Iran’s
allies, its levers of influence in foreign countries, and an extension of its
military power. Furthermore, Iran’s strategy is currently ascendant in the
region, and there is little incentive for it to back away from an approach
that has brought much success. It should also be recognized that Iran’s
investments are not all created equal. Syria means infinitely more to
Iranian leaders than Yemen, so pushing back in Yemen will have a
decidedly small impact on Iran’s overall strategic objectives. Yemen is a
distraction for Iran’s rivals and well removed from the core of its inter-
ests. Success for the Houthis in Yemen would of course benefit Iran, but
their failure will not dramatically affect its regional aims. Thus, it will be
difficult if not impossible to pressure Iran’s leaders—through sanctions,
diplomacy, or military escalation in Syria, Iraq, or Yemen—to change
their approach.
127“Dar neshast-e markaz-e barresi-haye estratazhik-e riyasat-e jomhuri” [Meeting of the Presidential Strategic
Research Center], 7 February 2018, http://ispa.ir/Default/Details/fa/1846.
128By way of comparison, see Kapur, Jihad as Grand Strategy, 10.
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Iran’s strategy feeds off of regional disorder, Sunni sectarianism, and
Washington’s inconsistent policies. Those factors have created environ-
ments ripe for Iranian exploitation and increasingly helped push Shiite
activists into Iran’s orbit. Yet Iran’s weakness lies in the severe limits of
its patronage. It affords its clients little besides opportunity, money, and
weaponry. America and its allies have much more to offer. Therefore, the
United States should not back away from its support to the Iraqi govern-
ment nor cede Syria to Tehran and Moscow. Understanding that compe-
tition with Iran is a marathon and not a sprint and adjusting American
strategy in the region accordingly will better position the United States
and its allies to compete in the Middle East. Working to dry up the
sources of Iran’s political strength (such as regional war, anti-Shia sectar-
ian policies of Arab states, and unclear American objectives) will do
more to counter Iran in the region than military force projection or
escalation alone.
Looking Ahead
This article has argued that militant clients are a central component of Iran’s
approach to grand strategy. Cultivating clients has been a rational way for
the regime to advance its strategic interests, compete with its adversaries, and
achieve success on the battlefield, while navigating the constraints and isola-
tion imposed on it by greater powers. Militant clients afford Iran an offensive
tool and a deterrent capability not easily countered by the conventional capa-
bilities of its adversaries. In short, militant clients provide a weak state such
as Iran with an effective means of competing with more powerful foes.
Although there are numerous costs associated with this approach, those
have been outweighed by the success Iran has been able to achieve: the
capability to actively counter America’s regional agenda, while expanding
its regional political influence and military footprint. Because Iran’s other
deterrent and offensive capabilities are limited, it has grown increasingly
reliant on militant clients to secure and advance its strategic aims. This
makes clients both an asset and a liability. If the key to Iran’s success has
been its clients, then they are also a key vulnerability.
Such a dynamic has important implications for the future of Iran’s role
in the Middle East and regional security. Should Iran’s adversaries ever
hope to seriously challenge its regional influence, they will have to co-opt
or counter its clients directly or—following Iran’s lead—challenge them by
cultivating new and more effective proxies of their own. (They could also
escalate against Iran directly, but that could lead to a far costlier campaign.)
So long as its clients remain resilient, Iran’s strategic approach will remain
effective. But if its clients were to suffer political or military defeats and
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Iran were to lose regional influence as a result, then it could compel Iran
to shift its strategic approach. How and to what end is beyond the scope of
this article, but future research could examine this issue in the context of
Iran’s nuclear program. Pakistan, for example, can arguably better with-
stand a degrading of its client network over time, because it retains a mas-
sive nuclear weapons arsenal and robust conventional military capabilities.
Those capabilities will continue to serve as credible deterrents. Iran, on the
other hand, has limited deterrent options beyond its conventional ballistic
missile program, which might make future nuclear weaponization an
attractive investment should its client capabilities ever weaken to the point
that they no longer hold adequate offensive or deterrent strategic value.
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